Markov-Perfect rent dissipation in rights-based fisheries

Thumbnail Image
Date
2012-09-26
Authors
Valcu-Lisman, Adriana
Weninger, Quinn
Major Professor
Advisor
Committee Member
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Authors
Person
Weninger, Quinn
Professor
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Organizational Unit
Journal Issue
Is Version Of
Versions
Series
Department
Economics
Abstract

We present a general, dynamic model of within-season harvesting competition in a fishery managed with individual transferable quotas. Markov-Perfect equilibrium harvesting and quota purchase strategies are derived using numerical collocation methods. We identify rent loss caused by a heterogeneous-in-value fish stock, congestion on the fishing ground, revenue competition and stock uncertainty. Our results show that biological, technological and market conditions under which rents will be dissipated in a standard individual transferable quota program are fairly special. These findings provide new insights for designing rights-based programs capable of generating resource rent in marine fisheries.

Comments
Description
Keywords
Citation
DOI
Source
Subject Categories
Copyright
Collections