Document Type

Working Paper

Publication Date

9-26-2012

Working Paper Number

WP #11009, May 2011 revised September 2012

Abstract

We present a general, dynamic model of within-season harvesting competition in a fishery managed with individual transferable quotas. Markov-Perfect equilibrium harvesting and quota purchase strategies are derived using numerical collocation methods. We identify rent loss caused by a heterogeneous-in-value fish stock, congestion on the fishing ground, revenue competition and stock uncertainty. Our results show that biological, technological and market conditions under which rents will be dissipated in a standard individual transferable quota program are fairly special. These findings provide new insights for designing rights-based programs capable of generating resource rent in marine fisheries.

Publication Status

Published in Marine Resource Economics, Vol. 28 no. 2 (June 2013): 111-131.

JEL Classification

Q2

File Format

application/pdf

Length

46 pages

Included in

Economics Commons

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