Economics Working Papers
Publication Date
4-29-2020
Number
20009
Abstract
Since 1950, India has been implementing the most comprehensive affirmative action program in the world. Vertical reservations are provided to members of historically discriminated Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), and Other Backward Classes (OBC). Horizontal reservations are provided for other disadvantaged groups, such as women and disabled people, within each vertical category. As discussed in Sönmez and Yenmez (2019a), the lack of a well-defined procedure to implement horizontal reservations results in extensive confusion. Indirect mechanisms currently used in practice do not allow reserve category applicants to fully express their preferences. Moreover, the sequential processes in use for OBC de-reservations lead to severe shortcomings. To overcome these and other related issues, we design choice rules for institutions that take meritocracy, vertical and horizontal reservations, and OBC de-reservations into account. The cumulative offer mechanisms with respect to these choice rules satisfactorily clear matching markets in India.
JEL Classification
C78, D47
Version History
Original Release Date: April 22, 2020
Revision: April 29, 2020
Departments
Department of Economics, Iowa State University
File Format
application/pdf
Length
41 pages
Recommended Citation
Aygün, Orhan and Turhan, Bertan, "Designing Direct Matching Mechanisms for India with Comprehensive Affirmative Action" (2020). Economics Working Papers: Department of Economics, Iowa State University. 20009.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_workingpapers/104
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