Matching with Generalized Lexicographic Choice Rules
Motivated by the need for real-world matching problems, this paper formulates a large class of practical choice rules, Generalized Lexicographic Choice Rules (GLCR), for institutions that consist of multiple divisions. Institutions fill their divisions sequentially, and each division is endowed with a sub-choice rule that satisfies classical substitutability and size monotonicity in conjunction with a new property that we introduce, quota monotonicity. We allow rich interactions between divisions in the form of capacity transfers. The overall choice rule of an institution is defined as the union of the sub-choices of its divisions. The cumulative offer mechanism (COM) with respect to GLCR is the unique stable and strategy-proof mechanism. We define a choice-based improvement notion and show that the COM respects improvements—a property that has important implications for real-world matching markets. We employ the theory developed in this paper in our companion paper, Aygün and Turhan (2019b), to design satisfactory matching mechanisms for India with comprehensive affirmative action constraints.
Original Release Date: July 2019
Department of Economics, Iowa State University
Aygün, Orhan and Turhan, Bertan, "Matching with Generalized Lexicographic Choice Rules" (2019). Economics Working Papers: Department of Economics, Iowa State University. 19019.