Economics Working Papers

Publication Date

1-9-2020

Number

20001

Abstract

We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individuals matched to acceptable outcomes. We show that it implies incentive, fairness, and implementation impossibilities. Despite that, we present two classes of mechanisms that maximize assignments. The first are Pareto efficient, and undominated, in terms of number of assignments, in equilibrium. The second are fair for unassigned students and assign weakly more students than stable mechanisms in equilibrium. We provide comparisons with well-known mechanisms through computer simulations. Those show that the difference in number of matched agents between the proposed mechanisms and others in the literature is large and significant.

JEL Classification

D47, C78, D63

Version History

Original Release Date: January 9, 2020

Departments

Department of Economics, Iowa State University

File Format

application/pdf

Length

34 pages

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