Degree Type


Date of Award


Degree Name

Master of Science


Industrial and Manufacturing Systems Engineering

First Advisor

Kyung Jo Min


In this thesis we model and analyze a series of closed loop supply chains to study the relationships among remanufacturability and profitability of each member of the supply chain. We also study the relationships among remanufacturability, government subsidy, and government penalty. In each model, we assume that the closed loop supply chain consists of a manufacturer who manufactures as well as collects used products and remanufactures and a retailer who in turn sells the products to her consumers. Also, we assume that the level of remanufacturability is a variable that is controllable via the level of investment of remanufacturing technology and equipment. Furthermore, in the case of government subsidy and penalty, we assume that the government provides a level of subsidy per remanufactured product and finances the subsidy by collecting an advance recovery fee per unit sold from the retailer. Throughout this thesis, we also assume that the manufacturer behaves as the leader and the retailer as the follower under a Stackelberg game framework and the model environment is captured in a static framework regarding manufacturing and remanufacturing. Numerous managerial insights and economic implications are obtained. For example, the manufacturer's profit may actually decrease with respect to the collection rate if the collection rate is low in the case of no government intervention in the form of the subsidy and penalty. Also, the government may be able to increase the total surplus consisting of all the profits of the supply chains and the consumer surplus by determining the appropriate level of the fee unit remanufactured subsidy and the fee unit sold advance recovery fee.


Copyright Owner

Kil Jin Lee



Date Available


File Format


File Size

87 pages