Degree Type

Thesis

Date of Award

2016

Degree Name

Master of Science

Department

Economics

Major

Economics

First Advisor

Elizabeth Hoffman

Abstract

Anonymous behavior in the repeated trust game captures many dynamics of a number of real-world economic contexts. Versions of the repeated games have been studied extensively in the lab, and dynamic experiments of this type have recently been increasingly tested online. There is strong evidence that surveys and single-shot games provide similar results in behavioral labs and on Mechanical Turk. Since dynamic behavior in repeated games is qualitatively different than surveys and single-shot games, equivalence of behavioral factors and cooperative behavior has not been fully answered. This study finds that both lab and MTurk populations have similar behavioral factors with a few differences. An equivalence tests suggests the behaviors between populations are equivalent within an acceptable equivalence region.

Copyright Owner

Taylor Weidman

Language

en

File Format

application/pdf

File Size

51 pages

Included in

Economics Commons

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