Degree Type

Thesis

Date of Award

2020

Degree Name

Master of Arts

Department

Political Science

Major

Political Science

First Advisor

Mark Nieman

Abstract

This paper examines how the different goals of terrorist group leaders affect their decision making calculus. This study uses a formal model and shows that terrorist group leaders who are more concerned with gaining concessions from the government are likely to use lower levels of violence. The empirical analysis echoes the results of the formal model and provides evidence for the external validity of the model. Taken together these results suggest that some of the variation in terrorist group lethality is due to variation in the terrorist group leaders' goals.

DOI

https://doi.org/10.31274/etd-20200624-199

Copyright Owner

Samantha A Fuller

Language

en

File Format

application/pdf

File Size

30 pages

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