Campus Units

Finance

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

3-1-2017

Journal or Book Title

The World Bank Economic Review

Volume

30

Issue

1

First Page

S176

Last Page

S187

DOI

10.1093/wber/lhw027

Abstract

We show that court enforcement uncertainty hinders economic development using sharp variation in judiciaries across Native American reservations in the United States. Congressional legislation passed in 1953 assigned state courts the authority to resolve civil disputes on a subset of reservations, while tribal courts retained authority on unaffected reservations. Although affected and unaffected reservations had similar economic conditions when the law passed, reservations under state courts experienced significantly greater long-run growth. When we examine the distribution of incomes across reservations, the average difference in development is due to the lower incomes of the most impoverished reservations with tribal courts. We show that the relative under-development of reservations with tribal courts is driven by reservations with the most uncertainty in court enforcement.

Comments

This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in The World Bank Economic Review following peer review. The version of record Courting Economic Development (with T. Cookson and R. Heimer). 2017. World Bank Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings of the 26th Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, 30 (Supplement_1), S176-S187. is available online at: DOI: 10.1093/wber/lhw027. Posted with permission.

Copyright Owner

The Author

Language

en

File Format

application/pdf

Available for download on Saturday, September 01, 2018

Published Version

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