Campus Units

Political Science, Statistics

Document Type

Article

Publication Version

Submitted Manuscript

Publication Date

2016

Journal or Book Title

Journal of Peace Research

Volume

53

Issue

3

First Page

409

Last Page

423

DOI

10.1177/0022343316629605

Abstract

This article applies recent advances in network analysis to highlight a central tension faced by policymakers – balancing the benefits of engaging with the international system and the associated domestic policy costs. International trade rewards certain domestic practices, such as respect for human rights. Enforcing such practices, however, is politically costly and sometimes prohibitive to state leaders who rely on political repression to stay in power. In such cases, domestic elites often resort to an alternative strategy of securing the benefits of international trade – setting up indirect trade channels through intermediary states. These competing incentives are modeled within a single framework using a formal network game in which states form trade-links (direct or indirect) with other states, while simultaneously choosing their optimal level of domestic human rights protections. The model suggests that there may be an inverse relationship between a state’s embeddedness within a network of indirect trade and respect for human rights: indirect trade channels serve as loopholes that allow domestically troubled states to enjoy the benefits of trade without pressure for domestic improvement. The predictions are supported by the results of the empirical analyses of the international trade and repression data (1987–2000), conducted using a coevolutionary actor-oriented longitudinal-network model – a statistical estimator that closely mimics the theoretical model.

Comments

This is a manuscript of an article from Journal of Peace Research 53 (2016): 409, doi:10.1177/0022343316629605. Posted with permission.

Copyright Owner

Olga Chyzh

Language

en

File Format

application/pdf