Campus Units
Supply Chain and Information Systems
Document Type
Article
Publication Version
Accepted Manuscript
Publication Date
12-1-2019
Journal or Book Title
International Journal of Production Economics
Volume
218
First Page
196
Last Page
211
DOI
10.1016/j.ijpe.2019.05.008
Abstract
Recent global developments lead companies to include into their strategic plans not only economic sustainability but environmental and social sustainability as well. Companies have been investing in environmental and social sustainability to meet stakeholder demand and/or regulatory demands. Considering this as a market mechanism, we view the sustainability actions of companies as interrelated strategic decisions and propose a Stackelberg game to model the effects of competition for sustainability and sustainability spillovers over the sustainability outcomes of companies. We provide equilibrium solutions for the one leader, two followers game over different intervals of competition levels and spillover rates. Using a numerical example, we observe how the sustainability investments and net benefits change as competition levels and spillover rates change and identify the competition-spillover regions, where each player invests the most and has the advantage in terms of benefit. We discuss implications for both the companies and the policy makers.
Copyright Owner
Elsevier B.V.
Copyright Date
2019
Language
en
File Format
application/pdf
Recommended Citation
Uşar, Damla D.; Denizel, Meltem K.; and Soytaş, Mehmet Ali, "Corporate sustainability interactions: A game theoretical approach to sustainability actions" (2019). Supply Chain Management Publications. 93.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/scm_pubs/93
Included in
Management Information Systems Commons, Operations and Supply Chain Management Commons, Recreation Business Commons, Technology and Innovation Commons
Comments
This accepted article is published as Damla Durak Usar, Meltem Denizel, Mehmet Ali Soytas, Corporate Sustainability Interactions: A game theoretical approach to sustainability actions, International Journal of Production Economics 218(December 2019);196-211. Doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2019.05.008. Posted with permission.